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Introduction 
The protracted conflict in eastern DRC is often explained by referring to the ‘conflict 
minerals’ narrative, propagated by activist NGOs, and frequently occurring in media 
and think tank publications. 1  Following this narrative, the various armed groups 
operating in eastern DRC are able to survive largely due to the profits they incur from 
their involvement in the local artisanal and small-scale mining sector. This involvement 
tends to take different shapes and varies from direct (‘boots on the ground’ in certain 
mines) to indirect (demanding rents from miners and traders in the region) ways of 
profiting.  
 
 This dominant perspective on violence in eastern Congo has led policymakers and 
representatives of the international mining and electronics industry to develop several 
initiatives to either ban Congolese conflict minerals from the international market or to 
make the trade more transparent. Following the successful campaigns to ban ‘conflict 
diamonds’ at the turn of the century, and largely inspired by the resulting creation of 
the Kimberley Process, which today governs the international diamond trade, a first 
conflict minerals campaign can be traced back to 2001 and initially focused mainly on 
coltan. Yet it was after the start of the CNDP military campaign in 2006 that most of 
the current initiatives were developed, focusing more widely on the so-called 3T’s 
(Tantalum (coltan), Tin (cassiterite), Tungsten) and later on also gold. Several 
initiatives promoting transparency and traceability of mineral exploitation and trade 
have been launched and calls have been made for legal frameworks prohibiting the 
import of conflict-related resources. Some of these initiatives were introduced by the 
mining industry. Notable government-led initiatives include the OECD Due Diligence 
Guidelines and the introduction of specific legislation by the US Congress, the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. 
 
 Attached to this Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, is 
a small section that requires companies listed on the US stock exchange to provide 
specific assurances that any products that they have manufactured or contracted to 
manufacture do not contain minerals “that directly or indirectly finance or benefit 
armed groups” in the DRC or its neighbors. Although the Dodd-Frank Act’s legal effects 
thus far are uncertain since its first reporting deadline was in May 2014, it has created 
a climate of uncertainty among minerals brokers and, in particular, consumer 
electronics firms, as to whether or not their current supply chains can be considered 
‘DRC conflict-free’ or not. A preemptive ban on buying Congolese minerals has been the 
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easiest response: many companies gave preference to shifting their supply chains 
elsewhere rather than trying to be in accordance with this new regulatory framework. 
Also the DRC government enacted a minerals export ban. Even if this ban was limited 
in time, it introduced a reconfiguration of power structures and trading networks, in 
some cases in favor of networks dominated by the FARDC. 
 
This paper presents a detailed study of how the Dodd-Frank Act in particular has 
affected several mining communities in eastern Congo, and the extent to which various 
conflict minerals initiatives have been implemented on the ground. Besides a desk-
based literature review, sources used include interviews with several industry and civil 
society stakeholders, the authors’ regular attendance of public and non-public meetings 
related to the various conflict minerals initiatives over the past few years, as well as the 
authors’ long-term field research activities in eastern DRC, including specific research 
visits by the authors and their associates for this study, conducted in March 2014 and 
encompassing northern Katanga, South Kivu and North Kivu.  
 
The paper concludes that even if no hard claims can be made about a direct link 
between the arrival of Dodd-Frank and current socioeconomic problems in eastern 
DRC’s mining areas, there are strong indications that the Dodd-Frank act has 
reinforced a number of dynamics within Congo’s mining sector. One direct consequence 
of the act was the announcement of the Kabila mining embargo, which was in force 
between 9 September 2010 and 10 March 2011 and which has had a paralyzing effect on 
the regional economy and a dramatic impact on living conditions, not only in eastern 
Congo’s mining sites but also in urban centers. But the Dodd-Frank has also served as a 
wake-up call. Participants in eastern DRC’s mining industry acknowledge that the law 
has increased their awareness of the urgent need to address a number of negative 
aspects of the mining industry such as militarization, corruption and exploitation of 
women and children. Dodd-Frank has the merit of having sped up the process of mining 
reform and of having stimulated a stronger Congolese involvement in due diligence 
initiatives. It has also changed attitudes and assumptions of electronics manufacturing 
companies and through them the mining companies themselves. As opposed to five 
years ago, there is now a much wider recognition that resource supply chains should be 
considered an essential part of the broader electronics manufacturing process, including 
any and all aspects of CSR and business ethics. Nevertheless, there is a widespread 
concern about the slowness with which these mining reform initiatives are being 
implemented. As a result, a situation has emerged in which the large majority of 
artisanal mines in eastern DRC continue to function in a grey zone between legality and 
illegality, making it very hard for local mining operators to get their minerals sold on 
the international market, especially to Western clients and at reasonable prices. 
Congolese artisanal miners also believe the push for further formalization of the 
artisanal mining sector is part of a larger process that wants to promote a radical switch 
from small-scale to large-scale mining.  
 
The origins of Dodd-Frank 1502 
 
There is a widespread assumption that natural resources are one of the key drivers of 
conflict in eastern DRC. The dominant narratives on the war,2 are that Congo is ‘cursed’ 
by its riches, that greed is the main conflict motive, and that armed groups are using 
revenues from the exploitation and trade of natural resources to finance their war 
efforts and to enrich themselves. Consequently, it is often argued, the easiest and most 
effective way to end the conflict is to prevent armed groups from making money through 
the sale of minerals from the areas under their control. 
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These perspectives on the DRC violence are both inspired by academic debates on 
the links between resources and conflict and by large-scale campaigns of international 
organizations aimed at stopping the DRC conflict through the cutting of the links 
between resources and armed groups. Already at the end of the 1990s and the beginning 
of the new millennium, European and North American advocacy groups such as Global 
Witness, Partnership Africa Canada, Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International 
started publishing reports about the looting of Congolese natural resources, expressing 
their worries and indignation over the fact that the international community failed to 
prevent key players in the Congolese conflict from enriching themselves and financing 
their war efforts through the illegal sale of minerals and timber on the international 
market.  
 
As a result of growing pressure on the part of international NGOs and human 
rights organizations, which in 1999 had already successfully lobbied for the creation of 
the Kimberley Process (a mechanism aimed at solving the problem of ‘conflict 
diamonds’), the UN Security Council decided to set up a panel of experts tasked with 
investigating “the illegal exploitation of natural resources and other forms of wealth of 
the Democratic Republic of Congo.” Between 2001 and 2003, the panel released three 
reports that caused a great deal of controversy, not only because they contained detailed 
information about the shady business deals of a number of well-known multinationals, 
but also because they described the personal involvement in the looting operations of 
several prominent politicians and heads of state from neighbouring countries.3  
 
The UN Panel’s revelations led to the creation of parliamentary commissions of 
inquiry in Belgium and Uganda, an investigation by the UK Department of Trade and 
Industry, and a series of talks with multinationals hosted by the national contact points 
of the OECD. Moreover, the Panel’s findings have served as important sources of 
inspiration for newly created and highly influential advocacy groups in the US such as 
The Enough Project and the Eastern Congo Initiative. 
 
Introducing conflict minerals initiatives 
 
Since the publication of the Panel’s findings, a plethora of initiatives have been 
developed in order to deal with the repercussions of the UN’s conclusions regarding the 
role of natural resources in fuelling violence in eastern DRC. As one observer recently 
put it, “the number of supply chain monitoring initiatives alone […] has become almost 
as dizzying as the list of armed groups involved in the conflict.”4  
 
One of the first initiatives was the so-called Durban Process. Although nominally 
inspired by the Kimberley Process for conflict diamonds, the Durban Process is 
essentially a local initiative designed to protect wildlife (notably gorillas being hunted 
for bushmeat) that had come under threat due to the pressures of the Congo war. Its 
premise was the overpopulation of the Kahuzi-Biega Natural Park by IDPs and illegal 
artisanal miners, which was resulting in serious threats to fauna and flora in the park. 
The program sought to remove artisanal mining activities from within the boundaries of 
the park and operated from a conservationist mindset. 
 
Other early initiatives (starting in 2006-2007) were government-led research 
projects to ascertain the feasibility of geochemically tracing raw materials based on the 
specific characteristics of their locations of original (mine). The Belgian and German 
governments for example, funded several of these efforts. The German initiative in 
particular, was eventually piloted in the DRC and Rwanda, and this expertise later on 
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inspired regional efforts such as the ICGLR. The Pact on Security, Stability and 
Development in the Great Lakes Region, which was signed in December 2006 by 
countries from the region and was supported by the UN and the AU, provides in its 
article 9 for the installation of a “regional certification mechanism for the exploitation, 
monitoring and verification of natural resources within the Great Lakes region.” This 
ICGLR Regional Certification Mechanism is currently being piloted, with Rwanda and 
the DRC having exported ICGLR-certified minerals. 
 
Responding to the UN reports in the early 2000s and consumer activism that was 
beginning to refer to the conflict minerals narrative, also several major multinational 
corporations started to respond. Although primarily driven by corporate social 
responsibility concerns, these initiatives were strictly voluntary in nature. The Global e-
Sustainability Initiative was launched by predominantly European corporations and 
heavily focused on the telecommunications industry. A predominantly American group 
of companies formed the basis for the Electronic Industry Citizenship coalition, which 
recruited more broadly in the electronics industry. Membership of these initiatives has 
in many cases been mutual, and both initiatives have since closely collaborated. Most 
notably was the joint foundation of the Conflict Free Sourcing Initiative, which in turn 
led to the creation of the Conflict Free Smelter (CFS) Program. The latter has united 
smelters, key stakeholders in the mineral supply chain linking upstream with 
downstream companies. The idea behind the CFS is to use the natural leverage of the 
smelters as occupiers of a key chokepoint in the supply chain: companies sourcing from 
CFS-participating smelters would be able to claim they are not sourcing conflict 
minerals, while reducing the burden of proof by relying on the smelter’s participation in 
the CFS. The CFS system is based on the established ‘trader’ model, but some 
downstream companies have expressed interest in getting involved in establishing 
closed pipelines, linking them directly to select mine sites. Given the cyclical nature of 
the coltan industry in particular, this would also deliver a specific commercial 
advantage to those companies. The most prominent example of such a closed pipeline 
model is the Solutions for Hope network sourcing coltan, led by Motorola.  
 
Specifically mentioned in the SEC’s Dodd-Frank S1502 regulation is the OECD’s 
Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-
Affected and High-Risk Areas, which provides detailed recommendations to companies 
on how to conduct due diligence to ensure that their activities in ‘conflict-affected and 
high-risk areas’ respect human rights and do not contribute to conflict. It has been 
supported by the UN Security Council with regard to the work of the Group of Experts 
on the Democratic Republic of Congo, and has been negotiated as a multi-stakeholder 
process among OECD and ICGLR governments, the United Nations, and industry and 
civil society representatives. The current due diligence guidance and its Supplements 
specifying procedures for Tin, Tantalum and Tungsten, and Gold, formally supported by 
an OECD Recommendation in May 2011 and endorsed by the ICGLR as part of the 
Lusaka Declaration of December 2010 as well as a number of other non-OECD and non-
ICGLR countries, has its origins in a series of meetings in 2009-2011.5 It should be 
stressed that “observance of this guidance is voluntary and not legally enforceable,”6 but 
its incorporation by the SEC as a selected framework that can help companies to comply 
with Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act, has greatly increased its stature. 
 
The most dominant initiative when it comes to actually certifying minerals as 
conflict-free is the ITRI Tin Supply Chain Initiative, or iTSCI. Originally developed 
(2008) and tested (2010, in South Kivu) by the tin industry (through the International 
Tin Research Institute), it has since expanded to include tantalum and tungsten ores as 
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well. It is the main supplier of 3T minerals from mines in the provinces of eastern DRC 
that have been verified as conflict-free, and follows the model of a closed pipeline. 
Through a ‘bag and tag’ process, individual ore shipments can be traced back to their 
points of origin, using the bar-coded tags attached. At various points in the supply 
chain, data is collected and fed into the iTSCI database. The iTSCI program and its 
various participants at different places in the supply chain are yearly audited. 
 
While gold, as the final element in the ‘3TG’ acronym that has become shorthand 
for Congo Conflict Minerals, is perhaps the most easily smuggled resource among this 
group of four, it has received far less attention than Coltan/Tantalum, Tin, and 
Tungsten. The specifics of gold—it’s high value and low weight making it easy to 
smuggle, as well as the ease with which it can be processed—make it among the most 
difficult resources to control. While a number of initiatives exist that try to eradicate 
‘conflict gold’ from the global marketplace, their impact in the DRC is limited, as these 
initiatives are mostly oriented towards downstream companies seeking clean supplies. 
Also, the strict nature of their sourcing protocols makes the participation of artisanal 
and small-scale miners extremely difficult. Under the auspices of the ICGLR, an effort is 
currently underway to implement a pilot project aimed at formalizing artisanal gold 
mining in eastern DRC, a first step towards inclusion in a conflict-free supply chain. 
 
Probably the biggest issue facing these initiatives is their sometimes 
questionable inter-operability. While iTSCI has achieved a near monopoly, it lacks 
public accountability and is reticent to share detailed non-aggregated information. This 
makes it difficult to engage with the ICGLR’s Regional Certification Mechanism, for 
example, which requires third party auditing. 7  Different nuances in the various 
initiatives sometimes result in rather awkward situations: while the OECD due 
diligence guidance is recommended by the SEC as a framework to work towards 
compliance with the Dodd-Frank Act, it is perfectly possible to be compliant with the 
OECD guidance, while at the same time being unable to report a DRC conflict-free 
status with regard to Dodd-Frank’s reporting requirements.  
 
Conflict minerals initiatives currently operating 
 
Centres de négoce MONUSCO 3TG 
Certified Trading Chains 
 
BGR  (German Geological Survey), 
bilateral with Rwanda, DRC, 
Burundi 
 
3T 
 
Conflict Free Gold Standard 
 
World Gold Council 
 
G 
 
Conflict Free Smelter Program EICC/GeSI 
 
3TG 
 
Conflict Free Tin Initiative 
 
Dutch government, private sector 
 
Tin (closed-pipe supply chain) 
 
ICGLR Regional Certification 
Mechanism 
International Conference for the 
Great Lakes Region, GIZ (German 
Development Cooperation) 
 
3TG 
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ITRI Tin Supply Chain Initiative 
(iTSCI) 
 
International Tin Research 
Institute, Tantalum-Niobium 
Study Centre 
 
3T 
 
OECD Due Diligence Guidance 
 
OECD 
 
3TG 
 
Public-Private Alliance for 
Responsible Minerals Trade 
 
Corporate, government (US DoS), 
civil society actors 
 
3TG 
 
Responsible Gold Guidance 
 
London Bullion Market 
Association 
 
G 
 
Responsible Sourcing Guidance 
 
Dubai Multi Commodity Center 
 
3TG 
 
RJC Code of Practices, Chain of 
Custody Standards 
 
Responsible Jewellery Council 
 
G 
 
Solutions for Hope 
 
Motorola, AVX, etc.  
 
Tantalum (closed-pipe supply 
chain) 
 
 
 
Lobbying efforts by civil society groups 
 
As mentioned already, the first conflict minerals campaigns of international 
organizations mainly targeted coltan, with “coltan has become symbolic of how ordinary 
people on the other side of the world, through their consumption habits, are implicated 
in conflict and injustice.”8 The first such campaign, following the publication of the 
United Nations’ first report in 2001, was that of a Belgian alliance of development and 
human rights NGOs. This campaign (“Geen bloed aan mijn GSM” - no blood on my cell 
phone) utilized the mobile phone as a device connecting a largely marginalized Central 
African conflict with Western consumers, through one of its key components, an 
unfamiliar mineral called coltan. Often cited in this regard is the sudden spike in coltan 
prices in late 2000, blamed on the production requirements of the PlayStation 2 game 
console. In reality, the price spike was caused by speculation rather than any serious 
coltan shortages.9 The campaign of a network of Belgian NGOs was followed by other 
initiatives. Several of these campaigns, such as the Fatal Transactions coalition, already 
had previous experience dealing with conflict diamonds. This experience has also 
influenced thinking on how to combat these conflict minerals, as initial discussions of 
non-diamond conflict minerals frequently raised the option to expand the Kimberley 
Process Certification Scheme, an option that ultimately proved not feasible. 
 
While correctly pointing at natural resources as a conflict driver in eastern DRC, 
these awareness-raising campaigns resulted in an over-magnification of existing trends 
and facts. Although the involvement of armed actors (and their proxies) in mining 
activities both during the war and the post-conflict period cannot be ignored, the 
prevailing perception of this issue often lacks a nuanced understanding of the complex 
interaction between resources and conflict. This is partly the result of a lack of empirical 
data on conditions in the mining centers and local trading networks, (only a limited 
number of cases have been publicly well-documented so far) but also of the reductionist 
and simplified narrative presented by different advocacy strategies. One example was 
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the often cited claims that 80% of the world’s coltan reserves were located in the DRC, 
or that 80% of global coltan production came from conflict areas in the DRC. While such 
figures contributed to the sense of urgency that advocacy campaigns were evoking, they 
were rarely supported by empirical evidence. Current informed estimates put the 
Congolese part of global coltan reserves at around 7 to 8 per cent, while “for most of the 
2000s the country may have produced around 20% of the world’s tantalite.”10 
 
Also in the US, attention for the Congo wars and the role of natural resources 
was growing. A pivotal role was played by the Enough Project, an organization which 
has been trying to get the eastern DRC crisis more prominently on the political agenda 
in the US. Although the organization’s initial publications “emphasized the complex 
nature of the violence there and the need for multi-pronged approaches to crisis 
resolution”, starting in April 2009 the Enough Project started to frame its campaigns 
around the conflict minerals narrative.11 Using YouTube videos where “your cell phone” 
is directly blamed for the violence in eastern Congo,12 and making use of celebrity 
endorsements to further their campaign, the Enough Project focused on grassroots 
activism in the US. Notable in this regard are the Conflict Free Cities, an initiative 
whereby US cities were to be encouraged to “stand up for the people of East Congo” by 
passing a resolution voicing their demand for conflict-free minerals.13 Another initiative 
launched by the Enough Project is the Conflict-Free Campus Initiative, which sought to 
“draw on the power of student leadership and activism to bring about peace in the 
Congo”, by encouraging universities to pressure electronics companies for conflict-free 
products.14 At Stanford University, student activists organized a conference in April 
2011 (“From Your Campus to the Congo: Conflict Minerals and their Impact”) in order to 
share experiences and lessons learned on “how American universities can affect conflicts 
occurring thousands of miles away”.15 
 
Conflict minerals campaigns in the US 
 
As a result of growing pressure from these lobby campaigns in the US, political support 
started rising in favor of actions aimed ending this Congo conflict through the 
interruption of its alleged financial lifeline. In 2008, US Senator Sam Brownback first 
proposed the Conflict Coltan and Cassiterite Act (S.308), co-sponsored by Senator 
Richard Durbin, which would make the importation of coltan and cassiterite (and 
products in which they are contained) from the DRC illegal, with appropriate civil and 
criminal penalties. The proposal did not make it into a law as it never received a floor 
vote,16 but was subsequently re-introduced in 2009 as the Congo Conflict Minerals Act 
(S.891), co-sponsored by Senators Durbin and Feingold, with 20 other Senators following 
in subsequent months. The latter was a more detailed version of the Coltan and 
Cassiterite Act, but did not include penalties for non-compliance. In the US House of 
Representatives, a Conflict Minerals Trade Act (HR 4128) was proposed a few months 
later, by Representative Jim McDermott.  
 
Like the Coltan and Cassiterite Act, the Congo Conflict Minerals Act never 
became law, because of insufficient political support. However, its sponsors refused to 
give up, this time seeing "an opportunity in the free-wheeling debate surrounding Dodd-
Frank."17 The bill was duly transformed into an amendment to the Dodd-Frank Act, of 
which it would become Section 1502. 
 
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act is a 
voluminous piece of legislation focused on reforming the US financial system, in the 
wake of the 2008 financial crisis. Strikingly, however, several of its provisions seem 
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unrelated to the daily activities of Wall Street bankers. Section 1502 of this act requires 
companies to disclose whether they are incorporating certain minerals in their products 
that come from the DRC or adjoining countries. Although the 3TG-group is specifically 
mentioned, the actual text of the law refers to conflict minerals, with the definition 
referring not only to the 3TG group, but also to any other mineral that can be 
determined, by the US Secretary of State, to be financing conflict in the DRC or its 
neighboring countries. Like the Congo Conflict Minerals Act from which S1502 has been 
derived (but in contrast to the earlier proposal for a Coltan and Cassiterite Act), Section 
1502 does not seek to penalize companies whose sources are not DRC conflict-free. 
Another significant difference is that Section 1502, unlike the Congo Conflict Minerals 
Act, does not require the US government to “assist and empower communities in the 
eastern Democratic Republic of Congo whose livelihoods depend on the mineral trade.”18 
As a well-connected interviewee in Obama’s Law argued, whereas the Conflict Minerals 
Act was relatively well-balanced – recognizing the need for assistance to the Congolese 
people to ameliorate the mining sector and linking this with repressive measures, 
Section 1502 was unfortunately restricted to repressive measures.19 
 
The specific regulations needed to be put this into practice, where left for the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to develop. However, the SEC is evidently 
not the best placed actor within the US government to develop the appropriate 
guidelines, a fact which the Commission itself has readily acknowledged.20 The lengthy 
process whereby interested stakeholders were requested to submit their comments to 
the Commission has resulted in significant delays in the promulgation of these 
regulations. While the initial target date for the publication of the final rule would be 
between August and December 2011, this deadline was twice extended, with a final rule 
adopted on 22 August 2012.21  
 
First reporting from companies is due in May 2014, however industry observers 
have remarked that the law will not be fully implemented until two to four years from 
now, as the regulations allow for an interim period (two or four years depending on 
company size) during which companies are given time to determine the extent of their 
liability and the ways in which they will need to enact the required due diligence efforts. 
 
Industry responses to Dodd-Frank S.1502 
 
The most immediate effect of the Dodd-Frank Act, with the possible exception of the 
DRC government's self-imposed export ban shortly after the law was passed, has been 
the sudden rush of companies discovering existing efforts to increase transparency in 
the Great Lakes mining sector. With the legal burden now introduced by the Dodd-
Frank Act, these initiatives were suddenly transformed from the voluntary efforts of a 
relatively small group of parties, to necessary tools to comply with US legislation.  
 
Furthermore, the requirement that companies’ due diligence efforts have to be 
audited by independent, third party auditors has resulted in the creation of a niche 
industry dedicated to delivering conflict minerals-related services. Originally dominated 
by a handful of relatively small, specialized consulting firms with previous expertise in 
dealing with artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) for multinational mining 
corporations and for international donors with an interest in natural resource 
governance and related development projects, these pioneers are now increasingly 
joined by more generalist consulting and auditing firms that have sought to offer conflict 
minerals services to their clients. Indeed, a notable presence at the 2014 Electronics 
Industry Citizenship Coalition (EICC)-hosted 13th Conflict Free Sourcing Initiative 
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Workshop 22  have been such third-party service providers, many of whom having 
recognized a growing business opportunity. Likewise, the proliferation in recent years of 
conflict minerals symposia organized by industry-related groups and aimed at raising 
awareness within the private sector can to a very large extent, be linked to the 
legislative pressure imposed by Dodd-Frank.  
 
This all being said, a business opportunity for some often implies an increasing 
financial burden to others: whether most of the due diligence is done in-house or by 
external consultants, there is still a significant cost associated with this process, in 
addition to the cost of an external audit of said due diligence efforts. While the SEC 
came forward with an estimate of this cost to US-listed companies, many industry 
stakeholders feared that the cost of compliance with the Dodd-Frank Act would quickly 
grow beyond the SEC’s original estimates. A study conducted by Tulane University, 
conducted upon request by Senator Durbin, looked at the estimated cost of compliance, 
and concluded that “the cost of implementing these actions comes to $7.93 billion”,23 
several degrees of magnitude higher than the SEC’s initial estimates, which were later 
increased. 
 
In October 2012, shortly after the SEC published its final rules, a coalition of US 
industry stakeholders filed a lawsuit to block the law. While the rule was upheld by 
federal court, an appeal was filed in August 2013. The plaintiffs argued that “the SEC 
made several regulatory choices that place unprecedented and extreme compliance 
burdens on America’s job creators without ending violence in the DRC.”24 It is unclear to 
what extent companies have been postponing or delaying their compliance efforts 
pending the court’s decision. However, according to a prominent law firm offering 
conflict minerals services, “since early 2014 […], many companies that slowly had been 
ramping up their compliance now have a much greater sense of urgency, in some cases 
bordering on panic”25 
 
On 14 April 2014, the US Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit ruled that the 
requirement imposed on companies to report to the SEC and on their websites that their 
products have not been found to be ‘DRC Conflict-Free’, is a violation of the US 1st 
Amendment. It is now the duty of a lower court to determine whether this violation is 
due to the SEC’s implementing rules, or the Dodd-Frank Act itself. Significantly, the 
Court dismissed all other challenges to Section 1502, upholding the remaining SEC 
regulations.26  
 
Nevertheless, no matter what the final outcome of this legal challenge will be, it 
is worth noting that Section 1502 does not provide for any kind of legal penalties for 
non-compliance: it has always been understood by most actors that the only penalties 
for non-compliance would be risk of brand damage associated with a public shaming by 
NGOs. Therefore, most of the larger companies will likely continue their compliance 
processes, regardless of the court’s ultimate decision. It should also be noted that several 
of these large companies have publicly distanced themselves from efforts to repeal the 
SEC rules.  
Mixed views, local livelihoods and growing awareness  
 
Even if much speculation exists about the impact of the Dodd-Frank act on people’s 
livelihoods in mining areas, it is difficult to make a clear assessment of the direct 
relation between the announcement of this act and changes in the artisanal mining 
sector in eastern DRC. Several other internationally supported initiatives followed 
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since, while other dynamics such as world market price fluctuations, and local political, 
environmental and security issues also have had an impact on this sector. It is therefore 
very difficult to assess which factor – or combination of factors – has had the greatest 
influence on the evolution of people’s livelihoods in the past three and a half years.  
 
Many of the people interviewed for this paper indicated that Dodd-Frank and 
Kabila’s immediate decision to suspend all mining activities in eastern DRC had caught 
them by surprise. They did not see it coming and certainly had no idea of how it would 
affect their daily activities and their ability to secure their livelihoods in the long run. 
There is a general conviction among respondents that the Kabila embargo was the direct 
outcome of American pressure on the Congolese government to tackle the problem of 
conflict minerals as soon and thoroughly as possible. At the same time, it is a shared 
impression that decision-makers—both at the international and national levels—did not 
give much thought and consideration to the impact of their initiatives on people’s 
everyday lives in Congo’s mining areas. 
 
Much frustration also exists from the fact that mining operators were given little 
or no information about what the new legislation entailed. One NGO worker involved in 
a sensitization campaign about the various mining reform initiatives in North Kivu 
explained that most artisanal miners in eastern DRC did not seem to know even the 
existence of the Dodd-Frank Act. 27  In the territory of Fizi in South Kivu, several 
interviewees complained that only a small group of powerful people at the local level— 
customary authorities and leaders of mining cooperatives—had a general idea of the 
content of the law. In their view, the ordinary population had been completely left into 
the dark, even though they were the ones potentially most affected by the new 
legislation. One member of a mining cooperative expressed his feeling of impotence as 
follows: 
  
Not a single clause, paragraph or passage is known by us, who are expected to 
know the law best and tell others about it (…) It is only by chance that we found 
out there is a law called Dodd-Frank, which fights against violence and forbids 
blood minerals.28 
 
Despite these complaints about the lack of information about Dodd-Frank and 
other due diligence initiatives, several civil society groups and mining cooperatives are 
trying to sensitize the inhabitants of eastern DRC’s mining areas,29 and some actors 
have taken steps to explain their grievances to the authorities. ANEMISA, for instance, 
the association of mineral buyers of South Kivu, has sent several petitions and letters of 
complaint to the authorities in the course of the embargo period, between September 
2010 and March 2011. The President of ANEMISA told us that, thanks to his critical 
attitude, he received an invitation for a government-organized workshop in Kinshasa in 
February 2011, during which different groups of stakeholders in the mining industry 
discussed and signed the so-called ‘actes d’engagement’, a list of commitments with 
regard to their activities in the post-embargo era.30 
 
When referring to the socioeconomic changes attributed to the Dodd-Frank act, a 
general consensus exists among respondents. Overall, our interviewees painted a very 
negative picture of what life had been like during the Kabila embargo, emphasizing the 
ban’s paralyzing effect on the regional economy and holding it responsible for a wide 
variety of negative developments that have occurred since then, including rising levels 
of unemployment, school abandonment, armed group recruitment, criminality, 
insecurity and indebtedness.31  
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This corresponds with the findings of Sara Geenen, who, between November 
2010 and February 2011, did extensive research on the impact of the mining ban in 
South Kivu. According to Geenen, “the ban had an immediate effect on miners and their 
families, but also on petty traders and transporters, women selling vegetables on the 
market and school teachers in and around the mining sites.” Geenen argues that the 
Kabila embargo gave rise to increasing levels of malnutrition in certain mining areas, to 
a growing number of school drop-outs (as parents and children were no longer able to 
pay school fees), to difficulties in terms of paying for healthcare, and to a slowdown of 
the regional economy, with many Kivutians staying away from stores and marketplaces 
and refraining from buying food, clothing and electronic equipment. Moreover, Geenen 
shows that Kabila’s mining ban led to a situation in which surrounding agricultural 
regions stopped selling their products in the mine sites.32 These observations are also 
confirmed by the president of the FEC in Shabunda, who told us: 
 
Before 2010, we lived a normal life, but when the embargo arrived, it was like a 
thunderbolt, we believed it was the end of the world; everything stopped in a city 
that was really enclosed, trade was interrupted as the people were hiding their 
goods, noticing that something abnormal was happening. There was a total 
paralysis of activities, while normally the mines are injecting money into the 
local economy and are keeping us alive. (…)33 
 
In Shabunda, the vastest territory of South Kivu, agriculture, and artisanal 
mining have been the principle sources of income for the past few decades. Shabunda’s 
subsoil contains considerable deposits of gold, cassiterite, diamonds, iron, and coltan.34 
The remoteness of this territory and bad shape of local infrastructure have a 
considerable effect on trading opportunities though and are discouraging agricultural 
initiatives.35 Moreover, local transporters travelling in the direction of Shabunda face 
serious security risks, as drivers are frequently kidnapped and/or robbed by armed 
groups.36 Given Shabunda’s high level of dependence on commodities and supplies from 
outside the territory, it is easy to understand that the sharp decline of transport by air 
during the Kabila embargo had a dramatic impact on local livelihoods.37  
 
Also in the Lemera tin mine in South Kivu, the Dodd-Frank Act has caused some 
(indirect) effects on local livelihoods. In November 2012, the UN Panel of Experts 
reported that cassiterite prices in Lemera had dropped considerably: whereas, in 2010, 
cassiterite was sold at 8 US$ per kg, in May 2012, it was sold at 2.5 US$. The Panel also 
stated that the number of diggers at the mine was showing a clear downward trend, 
going down from 500 at the beginning of 2012 to merely a 100 at the time of the 
preparation of the UN report.38 In July 2013, according to Ben Radley, the producer of 
Obama’s Law, a documentary on the subject, the number of people working in the mine 
had gone up again, to approximately 300, which is still far below the pre-suspension 
level.39 In Lemera, Dodd-Frank did not only affect and change the livelihoods of the 
people working in the mine, but also those of other inhabitants of the mining town. One 
woman who used to run a restaurant in Lemera told Radley: 
 
I had a big problem because the people came to eat but did no longer pay. So at 
one point I found myself without capital, and this created a serious problem in 
my life, I didn't eat as before, I couldn't look after my responsibilities as mother 
of the family as before, and even the children who studied were no longer able to 
continue. And today, I have abandoned the work of 'restauratrice' and have a 
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capital of just 10 USD and am now selling ripe bananas in the street to support 
the family. 
 
The chairman of Lemera’s artisanal miners told Radley that the sharp decline of 
creuseurs’ (diggers) spending power had disastrous consequences for the local economy 
in the mining town: 
 
Because the pit owners had no more money to continue their activities, they 
stopped operating and even the number of diggers has diminished considerably. 
(…) Previously, there were about 2000 creuseurs, in other words, 2000 people 
who had money to spend in the evenings and who could make money circulate 
during the day. But with the Obama law, we were down to approximately 300 to 
400 creuseurs, who did not have any money: a kilogram of minerals used to be 
sold at 9-10 US$ and was now sold at 3-4 US$ (…) There were closures of bars 
and restaurants, taxi motos stopped circulating, houses didn’t find any tenants, 
construction sites stopped functioning, there was less traffic and poverty entered 
our houses. 
 
For many artisanal miners, the work in the mine was their sole source of 
revenue. Consequently, when mining activities started going downhill as a result of 
Kabila’s mining embargo, they had very little to fall back upon: 
 
Before the Obama law, I was the owner of a pit. I was a very respected man, who 
had a lot of power and money thanks to the pit, because I had a lot of minerals to 
sell and this allowed me to organize my life (…) I even succeeded in building a 
very nice house and letting my children study in very good conditions. But ever 
since the arrival of the Obama law, my life has been turned upside down. I have 
lost everything I had (…) I was forced to sell my house to be able to stay afloat 
and I’m no longer a pit owner. 
 
Given these illustrations of some of the effects attributed to the Dodd-Frank Act 
and related policies, some of our respondents also pointed to some positive effects. 
Especially in places where high-profile due diligence initiatives are being implemented, 
the Congolese military appears to become increasingly aware of the fact that their 
presence at mine sites is no longer tolerated (‘ils ont compris’). A public servant gave the 
example of a recent incident in Nyabibwe, in the Kalehe territory in South Kivu, where 
an ordinary citizen got into an argument with FARDC soldiers. When the soldiers tried 
to arrest the man, he fled into the Kalimbi mine. The soldiers did not dare to enter the 
mine for fear of negative publicity and therefore asked one of the mining cooperatives to 
have the man transferred to the chef de poste.40  
 
Some claim that today, the majority of the 3T mining sites (‘67 per cent’) are no 
longer under military control.41 Other observers are less optimistic and argue that some 
FARDC officers have developed strategies to circumvent the restrictions on military’s 
involvement in mining activities. A good example of this can be found in Kamituga, 
where soldiers are reportedly using their wives to continue controlling the mining 
business. In addition to this, they are also using other intermediaries, such as those who 
can keep an eye on their pits in the mine.42 
 
A second positive aspect of the introduction of Dodd-Frank, according to some 
informants, has been the search for—and revalorization of—alternative livelihoods, in 
other words, economic activities outside the mining sector that enable former members 
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of the artisanal mining population to make ends meet. In a focus group discussion with 
civil society groups in Bukavu, one participant suggested that Dodd-Frank may have 
indirectly contributed to a modest revival of agriculture in the eastern part of the 
country: according to her, in some places, people were trying to switch back to their old 
practices of tilling the land.43  
 
A third positive development attributed to Dodd-Frank is that it had the effect of 
a wake-up call. People say that the law has made participants in the mining business 
more aware of the consequences of what they are doing (‘la loi a interpellé les gens’; ‘elle 
vient nous redresser’). Before the introduction of Dodd-Frank, they argue, the 
militarization of the mining industry had reached shocking levels: there was a strong 
involvement of armed groups and members of the FARDC, and there were also a lot of 
uncontrolled mineral exports. Dodd-Frank is seen as part of an attempt to restore law 
and order in the mining business.44 According to those who are in favor of Dodd-Frank, 
the law has been important in the context of the struggle against ‘anti-values’ (anti-
valeurs).45 In this latter respect, it is worth mentioning that the process of mining 
reform in eastern DRC has been coupled with the creation of a number of new Congolese 
monitoring mechanisms and institutions aimed at documenting, denouncing and/or 
combatting cases of fraud and abuse in the artisanal mining sector. The rationale 
behind these innovations has been to promote local ownership of mineral supply chain 
due diligence and to raise awareness among local stakeholders about the possibility and 
need to jointly create a stable, secure and transparent mining environment.  
 
 
Box 1: Increased monitoring capacity at the Congolese level 
 
 The ICGLR has established a whistle-blowing mechanism as part of its Regional 
Initiative against the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources (RINR). The aim 
of the mechanism is to ‘capitalize on the knowledge of individuals witnessing or 
participating in illicit mineral activities’.46 The Congolese NGO Save Act Mine, 
which was founded in 2012 by a group of Goma-based traders and civil society 
representatives,47, is expected to play a pivotal role in its implementation. Apart 
from organizing investigative missions in the mining areas in the interior, the 
organization has created ‘fraud lines’ (numéros verts) - numbers people can dial 
for free when they want to warn and/or inform the authorities about various 
abuses and illegal practices in the mining sector. In February 2013, Save Act 
Mine set up so-called local surveillance committees (comités locaux de 
surveillance), which, at the time of writing, are still in their pilot phase. The 
pilot sites are in Goma, Bukavu and Uvira.48 
 
 The Bukavu-based NGO Observatoire Gouvernance et Paix (OGP) has created a 
new type of institution called the Comités de Surveillance des Actes d’abus de 
droits de l’homme et de Corruption (CSAC). These committees are operational in 
both North and South Kivu. The people involved in the CSAC have been trained 
in traceability issues. The CSAC can raise the alarm on a wide range of issues, 
for instance, on the existence of illegal roadblocks, armed incidents (and 
especially incidents involving guns), crimes (murders) etc…. The reports of 
CSAC are discussed during the monthly meetings of the provincial follow-up 
committees of North and South Kivu (cfr. infra).49  
 
 At the provincial level, Congolese authorities have established so-called follow-
up committees or comités de suivi. They are composed of representatives of the 
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relevant state services, civil society, BGR and MONUSCO. The presidency of the 
comités de suivi is assumed by the Provincial Ministry of Mines. The committee 
has to carry out regular assessments of the situation in the Congolese mining 
sector with regard to the implementation of the ICGLR’s RINR mechanism and 
the OECD guidelines. Furthermore, it is charged with monitoring compliance 
with existing national and international legislation concerning child labor, 
women’s presence in mining areas, and the ban on the involvement in mining 
activities of military actors, state agents, police, security agents and 
magistrates. The comité de suivi also has to keep an eye on mining operators’ 
contribution to community development, and it is expected to play a mediating 
role in disputes and conflicts in the mining sector.50 
 
 At the national level, the Congolese government has created the Commission 
Nationale de la Lutte contre la Fraude Minière (CNLFM), which is expected to 
work closely together with other services of the Ministry of Mines such as the 
Direction des Investigations du Secrétariat Général des Mines.51 According to a 
recent progress report of the UN Secretary-General on MONUSCO, the CNLFM 
is plagued by a lack of resources and capacity.52 
 
 The Congolese army has set up an internal monitoring mechanism. Since early 
2011, South Kivu’s 10th military region has a unit called Direction de Production, 
Agriculture, Pêche, Elevage, Eaux et Fôrets, which aims to identify and sanction 
army personnel involved in mining activities.53   
 
 
Concerns about the lack of progress in upscaling mining reform initiatives  
 
One of the key components of the mining reform process in the DRC has been the 
division of artisanal mining sites into different categories. Mining sites in the provinces 
of Katanga, North Kivu, South Kivu, Maniema and Orientale have received green, 
yellow or red labels depending on the degree to which the social and security conditions 
in and around the mines meet the standards set by the OECD and the ICGLR. 
According to Congolese law, only minerals originating from mines with a green label can 
be traded and exported. The Congolese Ministry of Mines sends out so-called Joint 
Assessment Teams (équipes conjointes), composed of representatives from the different 
institutions involved in the governance of the artisanal mining sector, to evaluate the 
situation in the different artisanal mining sites included in the mining reform process. 
Their assessments allow the Ministry to keep track of changes and to update the 
classification of mines.54  
Both in North and South Kivu, artisanal miners, traders and managers of buying 
houses (comptoirs) are frustrated about the fact that budgetary constraints and security 
issues prevent the Joint Assessment Teams from doing regular field missions. 
Theoretically speaking, all mining areas in eastern DRC should receive a validation 
visit every three months. In reality, however, this rhythm has proved impossible to 
sustain. An additional complicating factor is that it usually takes several months before 
the findings and ratings of the Joint Assessment Teams are reviewed and approved by 
the Ministry of Mines at the national level. As a consequence, by the time the Minister 
of Mines issues a decree to announce the status of the various mines, the information 
gathered by the équipes conjointes is often already outdated.55 As a result of the paucity 
and irregularity of visits by the équipes conjointes, large numbers of artisanal mines 
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continue to function in a sphere of illegality.56 It is estimated that, so far, only 5-6 per 
cent of all the mining sites in eastern DRC have been covered by Joint Assessment 
Teams.57 
 
Another constraint is the high cost of the validation process: the teams carrying 
out the assessments include representatives of many different parties (the Congolese 
authorities, Congolese civil society groups and companies, and international 
organizations such as MONUSCO and BGR), who are all are entitled to accommodation 
and daily allowances during their stay in the field. The three main funders of the 
équipes conjointes – USAID, BGR and the American NGO Pact – are expected to cover 
all these costs.58 Uwe Naeher, the head of BGR’s CTC project, told the authors of this 
report that, in his opinion, it was “not a sustainable solution on a long term basis having 
donors pay for something that should actually be paid for by the Congolese state.”59 
These financial challenges are not always well understood by actors on the ground, who 
sometimes accuse (albeit off the record) the funding agencies of being stingy and even 
corrupt.60  
 
Security equally constitutes a major impediment to speeding up the validation 
missions. In principle, the teams do not go to areas for which JMAC (Joint Mission 
Analysis Cell - the intelligence division of MONUSCO), gives a negative assessment.61 
Yet, even in cases where JMAC gives a green light, the missions can still face 
considerable security challenges. Sources in Goma told the authors of this paper that 
the North Kivu’s Joint Assessment Team has made several unsuccessful attempts to 
visit Bisie (the most important tin mine in the region, located in the territory of 
Walikale62) because certain armed groups have been causing a series of incidents in the 
mining area with the purpose of preventing the équipe conjointe from doing its job. The 
militia most frequently cited in this respect is the Nduma Defense of Congo (NDC) 
group led by Ntabo Ntaberizi Sheka,63 a well-known figure in the local mining business 
who is currently negotiating his reintegration.64 Also elsewhere, the North Kivu Joint 
Assessment Team has had trouble operating. One member of the équipe conjointe 
informed us that he had received serious personal threats during a visit to the Rubaya 
area, presumably because he was considered too nosy by some of the local mining 
operators.65 
 
Some of our informants also expressed regret that, in their view, the Itsci scheme 
has been dominating the traceability processes in the Great Lakes Region, this to the 
disadvantage or neglect of other initiatives such as those developed by the British 
company Geotraceability or the South African company Met Trak. Congolese mineral 
producers and traders feel that have not really been given the opportunity to acquaint 
themselves with the variety of different tracking and tracing tools. Instead, they argue, 
mining operators in the DRC have had no other option than to market their minerals 
through the Itsci system as this appeared to be the only way to make them acceptable to 
Western consumers. Those who have been in the unfortunate position of working in 
places that are not covered—or even taken into consideration—by the Itsci system have 
found themselves cut off from a considerable part of the international market. 
 
 At the time of writing, the Itsci system is only present and truly operational in a 
limited number of mining areas in the Great Lakes Region, namely in Rwanda and in 
the Congolese provinces of Katanga, South Kivu and Maniema. In North Kivu, Itsci’s 
arrival is very recent (March 2014). In the opinion of the critics of the Itsci system, the 
situation would be a lot healthier if multiple systems of traceability would be given the 
chance to coexist, all enjoying equal confidence and acceptance among end-users of 
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Congolese minerals. They are convinced that this would help to reduce the heavy 
reliance on one single provider of transparency, and they also believe it would facilitate 
the access of Congolese minerals to the international market.66 The disadvantage of 
such approach, however, is it would lead to the co-existence of too many different 
schemes, each having their own methodologies and requirements. 67  Also, Itsci’s 
involvement in the two most conflict-affected provinces of eastern DRC, North and 
South Kivu, has been extremely limited until now. Only a very small portion of the 
artisanal mining population in these places has been able to sell its minerals under 
Itsci’s bagging and tagging system.  
 
The slowness characterizing the activities of the Joint Assessment Teams and 
the implementation of the Itsci system contrasts sharply with the hasty manner in 
which the ICGLR certificate has been launched (even if it took a very long time in 
preparing and developing the certificate). On 12 January 2014, the General Director of 
the CEEC and his deputy sent a letter to the governors of Katanga, North Kivu, South 
Kivu, Maniema, the Orientale Province and Kinshasa to inform them of the decision of 
the National Minister of Mines to bring the ICGLR certificate into circulation 
throughout the entire Congolese territory on 20 January 2014, and to abolish—from the 
appointed day onwards—the existing (Congolese) system of certificates of origin 
(certificats d’origine).68 This meant that the mining authorities in eastern DRC were 
given hardly one week to bring the news to the different groups of stakeholders on the 
ground and make the necessary arrangements.  
 
Three factors help to account for the hasty introduction of the ICGLR 
certificate.69 First of all, the Congolese authorities were already several months behind 
schedule. On 6 June 2013, the CEEC officially had received the first batch of 100,000 
ICGLR certificates, which had been printed with financial support of PROMINES 
(Projet d'Appui au Secteur Minier).70 On that occasion, the Congolese Ministry of Mines 
had promised to issue the first certificate in the course of July 2013 and to make sure 
that the certification system was fully operational by the end of September 2013.71 
Second, Rwanda had already started issuing certificates for minerals exploited on its 
territory a couple of months earlier. Having integrated the ICGLR Regional Mineral 
Certification Mechanism into its legal framework in April 2012, the Rwandan 
government proudly presented the first certificate on 5 November 2013, for a shipment 
of minerals originating from the Rutongo Tin Mines in the Ruhongo District.72 Finally, 
from 10-15 January 2014, the Angolan capital of Luanda hosted the 5th Ordinary 
Summit of the Heads of State and Government of the ICGLR.73 In other words, the 
Kinshasa government was under a lot of pressure to act quickly in order to avoid losing 
face with its donors and the international business community. 
 
The unexpected announcement of the launch of the ICGLR certificate had 
disastrous consequences for mining operators on the ground. First of all, the number of 
green-labeled mines was far too low for the system to be able to work in a 
comprehensive manner. As one Congolese public servant stated in an interview with the 
authors of this paper, the decision to introduce the ICGLR certificate was a classic 
example of ‘putting the cart before the horse’.74 South Kivu harbors approximately 900 
mine sites, but, at the time of the launch, only the site of Kalimbi near Nyabibwe met 
the necessary conditions to be included in the regional certification system.75 A similar 
situation could be observed in North Kivu.76 Although, on 23 March 2012, the National 
Minister of Mines had issued a decree to grant a green status to 11 mine sites in the 
Rubaya mining area, it took almost two years (until February 2014) before these same 
sites received a new, confirmatory visit from a Joint Assessment Team. Consequently, at 
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the time of the announcement of the ICGLR certificate, there was not a single mine site 
in North Kivu where the system could start functioning.  
 
Actors at the grassroots level are very well aware that these realities are due to 
the lack of validation missions by the Joint Assessment Teams. Already in June 2013, 
more than 6 months before the introduction of the ICGLR certificate, the Walikale-
based organization ADECADEWA (Association pour Défendre les droits des entités 
coutumières et des autochtones pour le Développement Endogène de Walikale) wrote a 
letter to the national representative of BGR in Kinshasa, expressing its concerns: 
 
Our greatest wish is to welcome the Joint Assessment Teams with open arms so 
that they can validate the mine sites. We guarantee them safety and tranquility 
in the exercise of their task, which is very beneficial to our socio-economic 
interests. The population of Wassa, which has already acquainted itself with the 
process of due diligence of the OECD thanks to the sensitization efforts of Save 
Act Mine, also wants this assessment to take place as soon as possible, before the 
deadline of the launch of the ICGLR certificate in the DRC. If this does not 
happen on time, the minerals produced in this groupement will escape the official 
circuit through fraud and smuggling, which will lead to a loss of revenue for the 
population, for the province of North Kivu, and for the entire DRC.77 
 
Even though the author of this letter is probably too optimistic about the security 
conditions in and around the Bisie tin mine, he correctly points at the need to speed up 
the process of validating eastern DRC’s artisanal mines. If the Congolese government 
and its donors are serious about formalizing the artisanal mining sector and putting an 
end to the illicit trafficking of minerals, they need to make sure that due diligence 
initiatives are implemented on a much wider scale than is currently the case. 
Rising tensions between ASM and industrial mining  
 
A third trend that has been reinforced by the introduction of Dodd-Frank is the rising 
tension between ASM and industrial mining. Artisanal miners are suspicious of the 
trend towards formalization, which they see as an attempt by the Congolese state to 
strengthen their grip on the artisanal mining sector and which they also consider a 
precursor of a gradual transition to industrial mining. The suspicion of the artisanal 
mining population is fuelled by the fact that, since the introduction of the Congolese 
mining code in 2002, foreign mining companies have been acquiring a large number of 
mining rights in several parts of (eastern) DRC. In the process of distributing 
exploration and exploitation permits, the Congolese authorities have paid little or no 
attention to the presence of artisanal miners in the mining areas. This is leading to 
growing conflict, as more and more artisanal miners find themselves evicted from their 
working places, often in violent ways and without any form of compensation.  
 
There is a widespread concern and anxiety among the artisanal mining 
population that the hidden agenda of the Kinshasa government is to encourage the 
entry of more and more private mining companies into the Congolese mining sector to 
the detriment of the livelihoods of artisanal miners and others depending on ASM for 
their survival. Due to the lack of alternative livelihoods and as a result of the difficulties 
with saving money and getting access to credit facilities, artisanal miners often find 
themselves increasingly in a very vulnerable position. Afraid of loosing their only source 
of revenue, they turn to mining cooperatives or–worse–to armed groups for support in 
their struggle against private mining companies.   
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A first example that illustrates the growing tension between ASM and industrial 
mining in the Kivus concerns the Bisie tin mine in the territory of Walikale. In 
September 2006, Mining and Processing Congo (MPC), at that time a subsidiary of the 
Mauritius-registered Kivu Resources, obtained an exploration permit for the Bisie mine. 
In December of the same year, the company made an agreement with local customary 
chiefs, committing to provide various services to local communities and to generate 
revenues for the local administration in the course of its mining project.78 In 2012, MPC 
sold all its shares to Alphamin Resources, a Canada-based mineral exploration company 
listed on the Toronto Venture Exchange.79 Through MPC, Alphamin currently has full 
legal title over five exploration permits covering a surface of 1470 km2. So far, the 
company has completed two drilling programs, the first between June and December 
2012 and the second in August 2013.80 
 
On several occasions, the artisanal mining population has organized strikes and 
demonstrations against MPC. For its part, MPC has tried to silence the protests by 
signing agreements with local mining cooperatives COMIMPA (Coopérative Minière de 
M’Pama-Bisie), COCABI (Coopérative Minière et de Développement pour la 
Réconstruction) and ADECADEWA. What angers the mining population and the local 
community is that MPC has failed to keep its promises and has not respected the 
agreements with the mining cooperatives.81 
 
Artisanal miners interviewed in 2013 by the Commission Episcopale pour les 
Ressources Naturelles (CERN) in Ndjingala accused the NDC militia led by Sheka of 
being in cahoots with MPC and helping the company to prevent creuseurs from entering 
the mine.82 Meanwhile, at the time of writing, the newly arrived Alphamin Resources 
has difficulties convincing the local population of its good intentions as continues to run 
its exploration project through MPC.83  
 
A second illustration of the antagonism between private mining companies and 
artisanal miners can be found in the Rubaya area in North Kivu’s Masisi territory. The 
two parties involved in this dispute are the company MHI (Mwangachuchu Hizi 
International) of Senator Edouard Mwangachuchu, and the mining cooperative 
COOPERAMMA of the provincial MP Robert Seninga Habinshuti. Although MHI holds 
an exploitation permit from the Congolese mining cadaster (CAMI), which was granted 
on 11 August 2006 and which covers 36 carrés miniers (ca. 25km2),84  members of 
COOPERAMMA have been claiming the right to continue operating in the area covered 
by the permit. In fact, in April 2012, a mining consultant working as an independent 
auditor for the Congolese Ministry of Mines and BGR stated in a report that, of all the 
mining sites covered by the mining title, “only Bibatama is currently operated directly 
under the company MHI. All the other mining sites,” he added, “are currently without 
formal relations to the company, according to the mining code ‘illicitly’ operated and 
exploited by diggers (…) affiliated to COOPERAMMA.”85  
 
MHI’s presence is not only distrusted because of its (perceived) threat to local 
livelihoods. There is also evidence that, at least on one occasion, the company received 
assistance from the local administration to forcibly mobilize labor for road construction 
works. In early February 2013, the local chef de poste organized a salongo to work on the 
road Rubaya-MHI, giving tokens to everyone who took part in this round of community 
labor. Those who did not participate—and therefore did not receive a token—were 
obliged to pay a fine to the local administration. When, on 11 February 2013, a crowd of 
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artisanal miners and transporters held a protest March against this initiative of the chef 
de poste, FARDC soldiers opened fire to disperse them, killing two people.86 
 
There are persistent rumors that, in the period before November 2013, Seninga 
received support from the Nyatura militia, while Mwangachuchu was allegedly backed 
by certain officers in the FARDC.87 Seninga is a prominent member of North Kivu’s 
Hutu elite. In the 1993 Masisi war, he was the vice-president of the Combattants Hutu, 
a local defense group. In 1998, he was co-opted by the Rwandan government, and, later 
on, he became a key figure in the inner circle of Eugene Serufuli, the then governor of 
North Kivu. According to a recent report of the Rift Valley Institute, Seninga “has 
continued to use his influence – particularly in Southern Masisi, his home base – to 
alternate between rallying troops and brokering peace.”88 For his part, Mwangachuchu 
is a former cattle rancher, who fell victim to anti-Tutsi violence in 1995 and obtained 
political asylum in the US in 1996. In 1998, he moved back to the DRC. In 2001, he 
obtained an exploitation permit for the Bibatama mine. Prior to September 2010, 
Mwangachuchu exported the coltan mined in Bibatama through his own Goma-based 
comptoir MHI. Mwangachuchu’s relationship with armed groups in Masisi is not really 
clear. Nevertheless, according to a report of the UN Panel of Experts that was released 
in June 2012, Mwangachuchu “paid at least 5000 US$ to both General (Bosco) Ntaganda 
and Colonel (Baudouin) Ngaruye, in exchange for military assistance for his (electoral) 
campaign’ in Masisi in 2011.”89  
 
For several years, COOPERAMMA avoided direct negotiations with MHI and 
tried to strengthen its position in the dispute by obtaining formal recognition as a 
mining cooperative from the Ministry of Mines in Kinshasa.90 It was not until November 
2013 that the provincial follow-up committee of North Kivu (comité de suivi) succeeded 
in persuading the two parties to find a peaceful solution to their dispute and to reach an 
agreement about their joint presence in the Rubaya area. According to the terms of the 
agreement, members of COOPERAMMA are allowed to continue working in the area 
covered by MHI’s exploitation permit, but only if they sell all their minerals to the 
company. In case MHI is only capable or prepared to buy part of the mineral production 
offered by COOPERAMMA, the members of the mining cooperative are free to sell the 
remainder elsewhere. In addition to this, the two parties have committed themselves to 
respecting international environmental and mineral traceability standards, and to 
assist the Congolese mining police in guaranteeing security in the area covered by 
MHI’s exploitation permit. The agreement also stipulates that the two parties will 
safeguard the protection of human rights and will promote the peaceful coexistence of 
the different communities in the Rubaya area.91   
 
Finally, a third illustration of the tension between ASM and industrial mining 
can be found in the gold mining area of Misisi, situated in the territory of Fizi in South 
Kivu. Here, the presence of the gold exploration company CASA Mining Ltd has been 
causing a lot of controversy. CASA was formed in early 2009 and is registered in the 
British Virgin Islands. According to the information presented on its website, CASA’s 
exploration activities in Misisi are made possible through an option agreement with 
Anvil Mining Ltd, whose subsidiary Leda Mining Congo holds exploration permits for 
the mining blocks 818, 819, 820, 821, 822 and 823.92 
 
The ASM population of Misisi has developed several strategies of resistance 
against CASA. First of all, on 4 February 2014, thirteen participants in Misisi’s 
artisanal mining business (mostly pit owners and négociants) sent a petition to 
Marcellin Cishambo, the governor of South Kivu, to denounce illegal taxation by public 
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authorities, to criticize the high level of insecurity in the area, and to express their 
profound dissatisfaction with the arrival of CASA Mining Ltd, which they accused of 
starting its project without consulting or notifying the local population. The signatories 
of the petition were all members of a local organization called Solidarité des Jeunes pour 
le Développement de Kimbi (SOJDK).93  
 
A second—and a lot more worrisome—strategy of resistance has been the plan to 
start collaborating with members of the Mai Mai Yakutumba, an armed group that has 
been operating in Misisi since 2007 and that has reportedly been planning to violently 
combat the presence of CASA Mining in Misisi. From the moment of its creation, Mai 
Mai Yakutumba has been deriving a substantial part of its revenues from taxation and 
trade in gold from the mining areas of Misisi and Mukera.94 In 2011, the UN Panel of 
Experts reported that Katambo, the locality chief of Misisi and a known supporter of 
Yakutumba, collected “contributions for the rebels from other miners and traders 
totaling up to 200 grammes of gold per month.”95 Following the failed integration of Mai 
Mai Yakutumba into the national army, part of the group returned to their old 
strongholds (Ngalula, Nyange and Lubichaku), while others reportedly became active in 
ASM. At the time of writing, there are disturbing reports about targeted attacks on 
buses and motorbikes along the main road between Misisi and Kalemie, which are 
believed to be motivated by the ambition to extort gold from traders traveling via this 
route. Some of our sources also told us that several factions of Mai Mai Yakutumba 
(Abwe Mapigano in Ngandja; Kachoka, Misunga and Captain Kibukila in Mukera) are 
controlling gold mining locations in South Fizi.96 
 
Julius Mulya, who works as a community consultant for CASA, does not believe 
that the company is currently being threatened by Mai Mai Yakutumba in South Kivu. 
In a recent interview, he explained that people at the local level – and even members of 
the mining administration – often do not know the difference between exploration and 
mining, which, in his opinion, may help to explain why CASA’s activities are sometimes 
misunderstood or perceived negatively. While Mulya acknowledged that some artisanal 
miners might consider CASA’s presence in Misisi as a threat, he emphasized that Leda 
(CASA’s partner) obtained the mining concession legally and that efforts had been made 
to inform the local chieftaincy of the company’s plans in the future. CASA, he added, 
does pay attention to the interests of artisanal miners in Misisi: apart from allowing 
them to continue working on the concession, it also avoids drilling in areas where the 
diggers are at work.97  
Shifting trade patterns  
 
Before September 2010, two thirds of North Kivu’s export revenues were generated by 
the export of minerals.98 Statistics on the export of minerals in North Kivu between 
2008 and 2012 show a clear downward trend after the introduction of Dodd-Frank yet 
these declining official export figures only show part of reality. Several more general 
trends can be observed, which are instigated by the growing international attention to 
the assumed links between eastern Congo’s mining industry and armed actors, and by 
the different policy responses:  
 
First of all, in course of the past five years, three of the most important 
international buyers of minerals from eastern DRC have announced their temporary 
withdrawal from the region, thereby causing serious problems for their Congolese 
suppliers, who saw their long-term contracts interrupted and/or had serious difficulties 
getting their remaining stocks sold on the international market.  
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In May 2009, the Luxemburg-registered Traxys pulled out. This happened after 
the publication of a UN report in 2008, which accused the trader of working together 
with and pre-financing buying houses sourcing minerals from FDLR-controlled mines.99 
Then, in September of the same year, the fifth-largest tin producer in the world, the 
Thailand-based tin smelter Thaisarco (Thailand Smelting and Refining Company), a 
subsidiary of the Amalgamated Metals Corporation,100 followed Traxys’ example. The 
chairman of Thaisarco explained the company’s decision by stating that “negative 
campaigning from advocacy groups and adverse coverage in sections of the international 
media” was undermining efforts of the industry to clean up the Congolese tin trade.101 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the Malaysia Smelting Corporation, the third 
biggest tin producer in the world, also pulled out in early 2010. Before Kabila’s mining 
ban came into force, MSC purchased up to 80 per cent of all tin ores exported from 
eastern DRC. Shortly before the ban was lifted, MSC announced it would stop buying 
Congolese minerals because it was unable to guarantee that all of these minerals would 
be tagged under the Itsci system, as requested by the Electronics Industry Citizenship 
Coalition.102 
 
 In the case of Traxys and MSC, the decision to leave the DRC was not final. 
Traxys returned a couple of years later and was, in fact, the first company purchasing 
minerals from Nyabibwe’s Kalimbi mine with an ICGLR certificate, in February 2014. 
As for MSC, according to information on its website, the company currently sources 
between 15 and 20 percent of its tin production from artisanal mines in Central Africa. 
The company further states that most of the smelter intake comes from Rwanda and 
Southern Katanga, and that all purchases of tin concentrates from Rwanda and 
Katanga are done through Itsci.103  
 
A second trend is that Asian buyers have gradually taken over the market, while 
many of the comptoirs that used to be major exporters of 3T minerals in the period 
before Dodd-Frank were forced to close their businesses or move to other Congolese 
provinces or one of the neighboring countries. In Goma, the number of exporters went 
down from twenty-five to three in 2011. The only three comptoirs that continued 
functioning were Chinese-owned:  Huaying, TTT Mining and Donson International.104 
This was obviously due to the fact that the latter were not unaffected by Dodd-Frank. 
Taking advantage of the fact that large quantities of Congolese minerals threatened to 
remain unsold, Chinese companies started buying them at very low prices.105 For a 
moment, it looked as if the dominance of Chinese buyers on the Kivutian mineral 
market was going to be short-lived. On 15 May 2012, the Ministry of Mines suspended 
the activities of CMM and Huaying, because they had failed to respect the note 
circulaire on due diligence of 6 September 2011 (in which it was stated that mining 
operators were obliged to respect the due diligence guidelines of the UN and the 
OECD).106 Yet, at the time of writing, the large majority of cassiterite and coltan ores 
exported by Goma-based comptoirs are once again destined for the Asian market. The 
three most important coltan exporters are MHI, AMR/Mugote and MHI, while the three 
most important cassiterite exporters are Huaying, CMM and AMR/Mugote.107 
 
Several of the other comptoirs in North and South Kivu also decided to close or 
relocate their business activities to places where the mining reform initiatives were 
already up and running, hoping that this would increase their chances of safeguarding 
or restoring their business relations with Western clients. The case of the Bukavu-based 
Panju-comptoir illustrates this trend. Panju started in the import-export business, 
switched to the gold trade during the days of the RCD rebellion and became an exporter 
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of cassiterite and tantalite in 2005. In 2008, the Panju comptoir was the second biggest 
exporter of cassiterite in the Kivus, after the Goma-registered Sodexmines.108 When 
Kabila announced the suspension of all mining activities in eastern DRC, Panju tried to 
open offices in Katanga, but, like many others, he was confronted with various 
administrative constraints and financial requirements at the provincial level.109 In the 
end, he decided to close his business altogether. Another example is Clepad (Clemence 
Patrick Dealing Sprl), founded in 2007. During the mining embargo imposed by 
President Kabila, the Clepad management decided to temporarily close its office in 
Goma and open a second office in Lubumbashi in October 2010. Since 1 April 2011, 
Clepad has stopped exporting minerals from North and South Kivu, and has decided to 
concentrate on its activities in Katanga, showing a strong commitment to due diligence 
initiatives such as Itsci.110  
 
A third trend since the introduction of Dodd-Frank is that some of the 
international buyers of minerals from the Great Lakes region who used to also source 
minerals from DRC, have decided to engage in semi-mechanized or industrial mining in 
Rwanda, which is generally considered a more stable and secure business environment. 
The Rwandan mining sector has been booming in the past few years. Between 2008 and 
2012, Rwanda’s mineral exports grew at a rate of 44 per cent per year.111 Whereas, in 
2005, revenue from Rwanda’s mining sector amounted to 38 million US$, by 2012, this 
figure had reached 138 million US$. In the same year, ore exports accounted for 47.5% 
of all of the country’s foreign sales.112 Another factor is that, in Rwanda, international 
businessmen run a far lower risk of incurring reputational damage as a result of naming 
and shaming campaigns. A good example of this is the followed strategy of the company 
Minerals Supply Africa (MSA). Founded in 2008, MSA became a fully-owned subsidiary 
of Cronimet Central Africa in mid-2009. Before the Kabila mining ban, it used to be one 
of the largest buyers and processors of minerals from eastern DRC: in 2010, it was the 
exclusive buyer of nine comptoirs in North Kivu and one comptoir in South Kivu.113 
After the ban was lifted, MSA decided to limit itself to buying operations in Rwanda.   
 
A fourth trend that can be distinguished since Dodd-Frank is a move towards the 
processing of Congolese minerals on Congolese soil. Despite the fact that Masisi 
continues to be the scene of armed groups and high levels of instability, the African 
Smelting Group (ASG), a company with offices in Goma and Kyrgyzstan, has taken the 
risk to build a tin smelter in Sake. ASG has joined Itsci and has also promised to follow 
the OECD guidelines. 114  In Katanga, MMR built a tin smelter on the outskirts of 
Lubumbashi, with financial help of the Malaysia Smelting Corporation.115  
 
Finally, in several mines in eastern DRC, there has been a tendency to set up so-
called ‘closed pipelines’, which are made up of a predefined set of partnerships between 
creuseurs, négociants, comptoirs and even smelters in Asia and capacitor and electronics 
manufacturers from all over the world. Closed pipelines offer the advantage that the 
risk of contamination (i.e. ‘dirty’ minerals entering clean supply chains) is very low and 
that end-users have a secure access to minerals originating from mine sites officially 
recognized as conflict-free by the Congolese authorities. Examples of closed pipelines 
include the Solutions for Hope pipeline, which was launched in July 2011, and the 
Partnership for Social and Economic Sustainability, which was initiated in early 2012. 
The unintended side-effects of formalization  
 
Policymakers at the international level tend to believe that the creation of mining 
cooperatives is of vital importance, because, theoretically speaking, it can help creuseurs 
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and négociants, two groups of actors at the bottom end of the mineral commodity chain, 
to defend their interests vis-à-vis more powerful players in the mining business, such as 
buying houses, public services and private mining companies. In reality, however, few 
mining cooperatives in eastern DRC have genuinely served this purpose. Instead, 
mining cooperatives have often been instrumentalized by local strongmen seeking to 
gather a group of loyal supporters around them who respect their authority and who are 
prepared to defend their business interests in and around the mines. A good example of 
this is the situation in Nyabibwe, where the COOMBECKA and COMIKA cooperatives 
have, for several years, been disputing the right to exploit the Kalimbi mine. In July 
2010, this even led to a violent clash, which left one person dead and seventeen others 
wounded.   
 
Another unintended side-effect of the move towards formalization of the 
artisanal mining sector in eastern DRC has been the emergence of buying monopolies at 
the local level. Only comptoirs meeting the standards of the Itsci traceability scheme 
have been able to get their minerals sold to Western end-users in the 3T industry, and 
this has given them the power to unilaterally impose certain conditions on their 
suppliers. A first example is that of the World Mining Company (WMC) of Edouard 
Kitambala. WMC is a leading exporter of cassiterite, coltan and wolframite with offices 
in Bukavu, Goma and Butembo.116 When in October 2012, the Itsci scheme became 
operational in the Kalimbi mine near Nyabibwe, WMC was the only comptoir with an 
Itsci membership and thus the only one authorized to buy labeled minerals. According 
to négociants and creuseurs in Nyabibwe, this made WMC being able to force a fixed 
price (per kg) upon its suppliers. The situation started improving since October 2013, 
when the comptoirs Bakulikira and Rica opened their doors and started buying labeled 
minerals as well, thus obtaining the status of processing entities (entités de traitement). 
As a result of the end of the WMC monopoly, mineral prices in Nyabibwe started to 
increase.117 
 
In Katanga, a similar situation occurred. The company Mining Mineral 
Resources (MMR), 118  established in 2008, has grown into the most important and 
dominant buyer of 3T minerals on the Katangese market. Until the end of August 
2011,119 it was the only Katanga-based company authorized by the provincial authorities 
to export minerals. At the time of writing, MMR holds 36 exploration permits, most of 
which are in Katanga.120 In addition to this, the company has concluded joint venture 
agreements with Gécamines, Cominière and TSM, and it has also signed a contract with 
the Katangese Ministry of Mines in March 2010, thanks to which it now has exclusive 
access to four artisanal mining sites in Katanga’s Tanganyika District (Kisengo, Lunga, 
Mai Baridi and Katonge).121  
 
Through the provision of upfront funds to Itsci at the start of the project, MMR 
has played a key role in its implementation in Northern Katanga. Normally speaking, 
the costs of the Itsci scheme are covered through the so-called “supply chain levy.” Every 
mineral exporter is expected to pay a certain charge per ton of exported minerals and 
this money is then used to keep the system going. Because such funds are normally only 
available four to five months after the mining of the ores (when metals are sold on the 
international market), there was a risk that Itsci would be faced with a cash flow 
problem in the early stages of its activities in Katanga. MMR’s help made it possible for 
Itsci to overcome such difficulties. To avoid creating the impression that MMR would 
receive special benefits as a result of its generosity, ITRI made it clear in the financing 
agreement with the company that “ITRI will remain neutral in the operation of the 
system and will provide no specific commercial or competitive advantage to MMR.”122 
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Yet, Itsci has not been the only party receiving financial support from MMR. In 
February 2010, MMR signed a contract with the Police Nationale Congolaise, which 
stipulated that the company had to pay each officer of the Police des Mines a fixed 
amount of money per month. Moreover, at least until July 2011, the company also pre-
financed the salaries of the aforesaid police officers when the state authorities were late 
in paying them.123 The same thing has happened with SAESSCAM: MMR is paying 
these agents 100 US$ per month.124 The relationship between MMR and the mining 
cooperative CDMC (Coopérative Minière du Congo) is also shaped by financial 
arrangements. In theory, one would expect CDMC to defend the interests of its members 
—the creuseurs and négociants working in and around the abovementioned 3T mines in 
North Katanga—in their dealings with MMR. In reality, MMR pre-finances the CDMC 
négociants and obliges them to sell all their minerals exclusively to the company.  
 
In Kisengo, MMR and CDMC have been buying coltan at a fixed price at the so-
called buying points or postes d’achat, despite significant price fluctuations at the 
international level. This has not only led to protests on the part of the creuseurs and the 
négociants, but also to the emergence of smuggling practices. In this context, it is worth 
mentioning the phenomenon of the ‘hibous’ (‘owls’). The hibous are a group of négociants 
who organize the illicit trafficking of coltan from Kisengo to other trade centers such as 
Kalemie and Uvira. They do not operate on their own but have built up a network of 
local collaborators who keep each other informed about the evolution of coltan prices 
and about each other’s movements and activities. The hibous offer Kisengo-based 
creuseurs and négociants the possibility to evade the price monopoly of MMR/CDMC, as 
they offer them better prices for their minerals.125 
 
Political developments since the introduction of the Dodd-Frank Act 
 
Reconfiguration of previously existing initiatives  
 
All of the current initiatives (see previous sections) that have entered the stage of 
implementation can trace their intellectual origins in the earlier emanations of the 
conflict minerals debate. The critical impact of the Dodd-Frank Act has been to 
underscore the importance of their initiatives by obligating companies to conduct due 
diligence on their mineral supply chains. Individuals involved in the design and 
implementation of some of these initiatives, have been unanimous in their assessment 
that immediately after the Dodd-Frank Act’s Section 1502 became reality, industry 
interest in joining existing initiatives spiked. Within the ICGLR, which had just started 
considering the technicalities of setting up its own certification system, the passing of 
the Dodd-Frank Act gave it a final push: “the minute the Dodd-Frank Act became a 
reality, everybody became much more serious.”126 
 
However, the extended period of time that passed between the approval of the 
Act by the US Congress on the one hand, and the promulgation of more specific 
regulations by the Securities and Exchange Commission on the other hand, has resulted 
in a great deal of uncertainty about future legal requirements: industry actors knew 
they needed to comply with legislation that had not yet been properly clarified. It was 
therefore difficult for some of the existing initiatives to adapt, since they did not yet 
know if any significant changes will be needed to be made on their projects, in order for 
their materials to be accepted as conflict-free under the Dodd-Frank Act. Some industry 
stakeholders interviewed have confirmed their hedging behavior in this period, whereby 
they were trying to align their already existing initiatives as closely as possible to what 
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they thought was the level of assurances the Dodd-Frank Act might legally require. The 
chances of survival for any initiative, whose participants could not be guaranteed an 
effortless compliance with the Dodd-Frank Act, were expected to be rather limited. 
However, the emphasis on a clear-cut yes/no response to the question of whether or not 
a company’s supply chain is conflict-free, has been detrimental to the development of 
more gradualist and nuanced approaches to responsible sourcing of DRC minerals. The 
Dodd-Frank rules as they are being developed thus tend to encourage disengagement 
from the wider Great Lakes region. 
 
Proposed European Union Conflict Minerals Legislation 
 
Following the passage of Section 1502 of the Dodd Frank Act, conflict minerals 
campaigners urged other jurisdictions to "follow the lead of the US."127 According to this 
perspective, the passing of the Dodd Frank Act was a major act of leadership from the 
part of the US, one that should be emulated by all parties interested in a peaceful 
solution to the long-lasting Congo conflict. The European Union (EU) and its member 
states in particular, should be the next major stakeholder to follow suit. 
 
Already on 7 October 2010, the European Parliament first passed a resolution 
calling for the EU to legislate along the lines of the US conflict minerals legislation. 
Since then, the European Commission has communicated its intent to explore ways of 
improving mineral supply chains.128 The Commission, through its Directorate-General 
for Trade, carried out a public consultation on a possible EU conflict minerals initiative 
in 2013, as well as an assessment of the compliance costs associated with such an 
initiative.129 
 
A legislative proposal was publicly presented by the Commission on 5 March 
2014. With this proposal, the Commission aims to break the links between the 
extraction and trade of minerals and the financing of armed conflict, while creating a 
market within the EU for responsibly traced minerals originating from conflict regions, 
and improving the ability of EU operators to comply with due diligence frameworks. The 
proposal, centered on the voluntary self-certification of industry stakeholders wishing to 
become recognized as "responsible importers of minerals or metals containing or 
consisting of tin, tantalum, tungsten and gold"130, was met with strong criticism from 
conflict minerals campaigners. Activists warned that the proposed legislation will not 
keep conflict resources out of Europe. Their critique was directed against the voluntary 
nature of the measure, as well as the fact that it only aims to cover processed and 
unprocessed minerals imported into the EU, unlike the much broader reach of the US 
legislation.131 
 
Criticism also came from Members of the European Parliament. A report from 
the Parliament's Committee on Development on "promoting development through 
responsible business practices, including the role of extractive industries in developing 
countries," was adopted by the Plenary sitting of the European Parliament. Unlike the 
proposal that was at that time being finalized by the Commission, the Parliamentary 
report demanded a strong and binding measure that applies to every segment of the 
supply chain and, in a notable departure from the Congo-centered focus of the 
Commission’s proposal and the US Dodd-Frank example, to all natural resources 
produced in any conflict-affected or high-risk area. Furthermore, such legislation needed 
to be comparable with (but at the same time going beyond) the obligations under the US 
Dodd-Frank Act, so that fulfilling EU obligations would automatically result in 
compliance with US legislation. Finally, the European Parliament's report envisioned a 
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proposed legislation as being embedded in a wider approach to address the root causes 
of conflict and state fragility, and complemented by appropriate development aid 
programmes. 132 In public consultative meetings, members of the Committee on 
Development acknowledged that, in their views, the Dodd-Frank Act and associated 
hedging behavior by international traders had resulted in some negative impacts on 
local livelihoods, and stressed that any EU legislation would go beyond a simple due 
diligence effort, but instead be embedded in a wider strategy aimed at mitigating any 
negative impacts on local livelihoods.  
General conclusions 
 
This paper has pointed at a number of recent dynamics in Congo’s artisanal mining 
sector, some of which can be attributed to the introduction of the Dodd-Frank act. Our 
testimonies collected on people’s experiences during and after the Kabila embargo, 
which is believed to be direct consequence of Dodd-Frank, seem to confirm earlier 
systematic research. The embargo had a paralyzing effect on the regional economy and 
has drastically reduced people’s livelihood options. Even if Dodd-Frank for many 
stakeholders has been a wake-up call, has generated increased awareness of the urgent 
need to address a number of negative traits of the mining industry, including the high 
level of militarization, corruption and exploitation of women and children, and has sped 
up the mining reform process, little real progress has been made on the ground. Living 
conditions of miners have not improved, the sector is still highly militarized, and a 
multitude of exploitative networks still control large parts of it.   
 
Although several conflict mineral initiatives have now moved beyond the pilot 
and testing stages, large-scale implementation of these initiatives remains fraught with 
difficulties. Serious issues exist with regard to the upscaling of these initiatives towards 
covering a majority of mining sites in North and South Kivu. There is also a lack of 
coordination between different initiatives; although harmonization is rightly targeted as 
an urgent need by many stakeholders, it needs to be encouraged and strengthened, 
activities need to be coordinated, resources and data be shared and joint efforts be 
developed for a more transparent mining sector in the DRC, rather than focusing on 
small islands of transparency. 
 
Conflict mineral initiatives should strive towards a more global approach. The 
current all-or-nothing approach, exemplified by the Dodd-Frank-mandated necessity to 
state whether a company is ‘DRC conflict-free’ or not, not only encourages 
disengagement, but also makes the upscaling of existing initiatives a difficult and 
expensive undertaking. Adopting a more gradualist, process-based approach towards 
reforming the Congolese mining sector should make upscaling more feasible, while 
countering the growing tendency of disengagement. 
 
As was observed during our fieldwork, there is a growing sense of emergent 
conflict between artisanal miners and large-scale mining interests. Outside observers, 
who are easily seduced by the appealing assumption that the introduction of large-scale 
mining in the Kivu’s will yield greater resources for the Congolese treasury (through the 
comparatively easy process of taxation as well as increased mineral extraction capacity), 
should keep in mind the spotty track record of large-scale mining in Central Africa and 
the DRC in particular, as well as the fact that artisanal mining rents are often directly 
integrated in local economies. Despite the negative aspects associated with them, 
artisanal mines do represent a massive employment sector. 
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Many of the current initiatives also remain largely Western-inspired, Western-
led, and audited by mostly Western firms and expat consultants. This leads to a lack of 
ownership of most Congolese stakeholders. In addition, in their implementation, many 
of the initiatives are vulnerable to elite capture. This is particularly the case when 
‘cooperatives’ are supported. These cooperatives are often seen as structures expressing 
the interests of miners, but in reality serve the interests of local strongmen. Efforts 
should be made to involve Congolese actors in planning, implementing and evaluating 
initiatives in order to increase local ownership and to prevent strengthening processes of 
state weakening to the advantage of local strongmen. 
 
Finally, policymakers should reassess and reorient their focus from a narrow 
conflict minerals perspective to a more nuanced and empirically grounded analysis of 
the Congo conflict. Such an analysis will continue to emphasize mining reform in the 
DRC, but as an engine for growth and development rather than as a potential fuelling 
mechanism for violence and war. Mining reform should become a more inclusive and 
gradual process: the reform of Congo’s mining sector is a necessary endeavor, but one 
that should be more closely integrated with broader security and development concerns. 
Ultimately, it is a process that should bring far bigger benefits to the Congolese people 
than the attempts we have seen thus far. 
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